’Looking Through a Soda Straw’: Mediated Vision in Remote Warfare by Queisner, Moritz
Politik  Nummer 1 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 45 
’Looking Through a Soda Straw’: 
Mediated Vision in Remote 
Warfare 
 








Warfare has always been shaped by the attempt to overcome space through technology 
(Warf 2008; Virilio 1986). By extending the radius of military action with wide-range 
weapons (such as the crossbow or the laser-guided missile) or by replacing the human 
sensory apparatus with sensors that gather military intelligence on a far-off location 
(such as satellite cameras), technology defines the capability of intervention. As a way 
of operating from a distance, technical devices mediate both action and perception. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles, such as drones, have once again transformed the concept of 
remoteness in warfare. Their human-machine configuration has established a type of 
intervention that has not only relativized bodily presence but also allowed the gathering 
of intelligence during combat in real-time without the need for additional personnel on 
site. When direct eye contact with a remote location is limited or should be avoided, 
access to the operating field has to be carried out by crafting a view of the remote 
location using the drone’s sensor system. Relying on real-time visualization of sensor 
data corresponds to a visual regime, in which visualization becomes as a precondition 
for military action.  
The primacy of computer-generated visualization is often seen as characteristic 
for the visual architecture of drone warfare. Nevertheless, military operations that 
significantly rely on real-time visualization frequently address human vision and 
technical visualization as being arbitrarily interchangeable. Particularly in the context of 
remotely controlled aircrafts it is often stated that crews possess a pervasive, 
omnipresent technological ‘eye’ to kill with surgical precision from thousands of 
kilometers away.1 On the contrary, crews themselves compare visual access to the 
                                                
1 See, for instance, statements by the Obama administration. White House counterterrorism adviser John 
Brennan: “It’s this surgical precision, the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor 
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battlefield to the experience of “looking through a soda straw” (Cullen 2011, 122). 
Policymakers and journalists in particular, but also military personnel often oversee this 
disparity between a human or subject-centered perspective and a machine or computer-
generated visualization. Military training units frequently rely on an idea of vision, in 
which observation and representation, human vision and technical visualization are 
merged. As part of their training program, operators learn to strategically eliminate the 
separation of humans and machines in order to adequately navigate an aircraft as well as 
to control a sensor system. This symbiosis of operators and technology requires a 
practice of remote vision, in which seeing is detached from the human sensorium. This 
entanglement has, as I will argue in this article, a significant impact on the way military 
drone operations are conducted. The merging between humans and machines requires a 
specific applied knowledge of remote action and perception, in which the body becomes 
part of an increasingly complex socio-technological assemblage. Further, the blurring 
between human and technology raises the issue of how and to what extent vision is 
bound to the human factor in warfare. 
 
 
Dissociation of Vision and Visualization  
 
While imaging techniques produce visibility beyond the physiological and 
anthropological boundaries of vision, the ability of seeing has historically been linked to 
the presence of a human eye. The Civitates Orbis Terrarum engravings, a collection of 
early modern cityscapes first published in 1572, represent an extraordinary example of 
early urban cartography and, more importantly, a beginning split between vision and 
visualization. Most of the engravings were made by Franz Hogenberg (1535-1590). 
They were produced and annotated in collaboration with the theologian Georg Braun 
(1541-1622). Most color plates in the collection depict a city and a surrounding 
landscape from above. Notably, many plates feature human figures at the bottom of the 
picture whose gaze turns away from the scenery towards the eye of the beholder. It 
appears as if these figures are standing on a plateau; one can see a path leading from the 
city up to the mountaintop. The image below shows the flat terrain surrounding a 
Roman fortress that is today the city of Utrecht. The landscape is presented from a 
bird’s eye perspective while the figures at the bottom side are depicted in a horizontal 
view. Thus, their position drifts apart from the depiction of the city and the surrounding 
environment. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
called an Al-Qaeda terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it, that makes this 
counterterrorism tool so essential” (Brennan 2012). See also Friedersdorf 2012. 





Fig. 1: Trajectum (Utrecht). Georg Braun, Franz Hogenberg, 1593, Civitates Orbis 
Terrarvm, Köln, table 19.  
 
 
Why did Hogenberg decide to maintain the presence of those human observers whose 
perspective contradicts with the flat topography? It seems as if Hogenberg tried to 
legitimize the tilt towards a cartographic depiction of the cityscape with the presence of 
the observers within the picture that remain a legitimate part of the picture while sharing 
their vantage point with the beholder. This divergence of perspectives features many of 
Hogenberg’s plates in Civitates Orbis Terrarum. It suggests that Hogenberg considered 
vision as condition for visualization: The image seems to be only legitimized through 
the presence of a human eye – the bird’s eye view apparently needs to correspond to the 
view someone has taken from somewhere. The ‘unnatural’ perspective needs to be 
based on an embodied vision, in this case exemplified by two observers in the 
foreground of the plate. This optical set-up suggests that body and image are still 
conceived as an indistinguishable unit. Nevertheless, the instability of spatial relations 
in Hogenberg’s work confronts the viewer with a split between vision and visualization. 
Though the image attempts to base its perspective on the unity of body and image, the 
diverging perspectives foreshadows the rift between the image and the point of view. 
This rift becomes increasingly controversial with the rise of visual media, such as 
photography, film or video. These imaging techniques do not only produce visibility 
beyond the ability and scale of human vision but they also do no longer depend on the 
presence of a human observer. Think, for instance, of situations in which bodily 
presence is impossible, such as NASA’s Mars exploration or of situations in which the 
possibilities of operation are spatially restricted such as in computer assisted surgery.  
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These imaging technologies have challenged the claim of a subject-centered aesthetics 
in the aftermath of Sigmund Freud’s and Marshall McLuhan’s prosthetics and extension 
theory that were famously called into question by Friedrich Kittler who argued that 
humans are not the subjects of media (Kittler 2002). Kittler’s concept of technological 
mediation follows yet another notion of vision, in which a technological ‘eye’ continues 
to see beyond the anthropological limitation of the human eye. To show how imaging 
technology transforms the role of the observer in remotely controlled weapon systems, I 
propose to conceptualize the relation between body and image neither as a subject-
centered nor as a technology-centered view but as an entanglement of human vision and 
technological visualization. To demonstrate this form of entanglement, I will examine 
how image production in remotely controlled aircrafts prompt a drastic change in 
military intervention. In doing so, I wish to challenge the belief that images produced by 
remote sensing platforms yield a transparent battle space, in which the human is in total 
control.   
 
 
The Weaponized Eye  
 
The fusion of body and image breaks with the modern mobilization of image 
production, processing, and transmission. The presence of a human eye is no longer 
crucial to the practice of visualization. In Ridley Scott’s Body of Lies (2008), Leonardo 
Di Caprio plays CIA agent Roger Ferris who must stop a terrorist group from operating 
in Jordan and Iraq. When Ferris offers himself to the terrorists, the apparent superiority 
of high-tech observation breaks down, although Jordan’s barren desert landscape seems 
absolutely exposed to aerial surveillance. Surprisingly, Ferris is loaded onto a vehicle 
beyond the sensor’s visual capability, namely a drone transmitting real-time 
visualizations to the CIA situation room; the vehicles start circling around Ferris, and 
thus they unsettle a dust cloud that blocks all view. As they break off in different 
directions, the drone can only follow one of the transport units. 
 
 
 Fig. 2. Film still, The Body of Lies. Ridley Scott, USA 2008.  
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As in Hogenberg’s cityscapes, this film scene also suggests that our perception is 
mediated through images, the observer and the perceptual space drift apart. The 
downwards gazing observers in the cityscapes negate their pictorial arrangement in a 
paradox way. Ferris and the terrorists in Body of Lies raise their eyes to the sky. In 
doing so, they mark out a perceptual space that looms from above. While the cityscape 
makes the situation apparent, the video image offers no trace of the observer. The visual 
architecture of remote warfare in Body of Lies detaches from the operator’s perspective. 
This contradicts the traditional paradigm of the observer as a subject of representation 
and the image as the object of perception that has been the starting point for many 
theories of technical imaging, such as Descartes (1637) and Kepler (1611).  
New imaging techniques give rise to new mediums and practices of visualization. 
They seek to reach further beyond the un-seeable. As such, they represent forms of 
visual experience that can no longer be scaled by the senses alone. Various parameters 
of imaging – motion, radiation, and magnification – had been the subjects of artistic and 
scientific experimentation whereas Soviet filmmaker Dziga Vertov envisioned already 
in the 1920s a new bond between observer and imaging devices. In his 1923 manifesto 
Kinoglaz (that translates into ‘cinematic eye’), Vertov spoke of his intention to initiate a 
cinematic perception of the world. For Vertov, who was fascinated by Futurism’s 
engagement with technology, film was the medium to free the people from the 
imperfections of human vision. Vertov noted in his diary (1923): 
 
“Kinoglaz lives and moves in space and time, takes impressions and fixes them 
quite differently than the human eye. The condition of our body during 
observation and the number of moments how we perceive this or that 
phenomenon are in no ways compulsory for the camera” (Vertov 1923/1973, 
15).2 
 
In his diary, Vertov repeatedly switches into a machine perspective: 
 
“I am Kinoglaz. I am a mechanical eye. I, the machine, show you the world as 
only I can see it. Now and forever, I free myself from human immobility. I am in 
constant motion, I draw near objects and then back away, I crawl under them, I 
climb onto them, I move along with the muzzle of a galloping horse, I plunge full 
speed into the crowd, I outstrip running soldiers, I take off with planes, I soar and 
plunge together with plunging and soaring bodies.” (Vertov 1923/1973, 15) 
 
While Brown and Hogenberg’s cityscapes comply with a visual architecture that centers 
on the observer, Vertov’s camera detaches from the body. In doing so, Vertov 
eliminates the linear relationship between vision and point of view. The human eye is 
intentionally replaced by a camera that moves around in an unconstrained fashion. This 
technological disposition marks the beginning of a media history, in which the camera 
                                                
2 Vertov’s quotes have been translated from German by the author. 
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serves as a technical eye (often known as the metaphor of the weaponized eye). This 
concept of the artificial eye has ever since been applied to merge the fields of vision and 
visualization. Cyborg vision and ‘seeing’ cameras permeate contemporary discourse in 
the field of cultural and media studies, often presupposing either a transition or a rupture 
from sense-based to technical forms of seeing (Dorrian & Pousin 2013, Vertesi 2015, 
Trogemann 2014, Geimer 2010, Verbeek 2007, Harris 2006).  
In Bilder aus Versehen (Unintentional Images), Geimer studies what he terms the 
‘optical unconsciousness’ of early photography. Taking Julius Neubronner’s aerial 
photographs as an example, Geimer argues that traditionally technical media have been 
measured by the senses (2010, 319-331). Neubronner patented pigeon photography in 
1908, a technique that captures aerial photographs from a bird’s-eye view by fitting a 




Fig. 3. Patent drawings of Neubronner’s pigeon camera with two lenses. Julius 
Neubronner, 1907, Patent GB190813128 (A) ‘Method of and Means for Taking 
Photographs of Landscapes from Above’, European Patent Office. 
 
 
Geimer states that Neubronner’s photographs are “not based on a gaze that someone or 
something in 1908 had directed into the depth of the landscape” (2010, 328). He 
concludes that the camera cannot possess a subjective view or gaze since the author of 
the photograph is not the one executing it. For this reason, image authorship is 
inconclusive: It cannot be traced back to a specific observer (2010, 327). Geimer’s 
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reasoning applies equally to Vertov’s filming technique, which still kept image 
production and image reception separate from each other in regard to time and space – 
the recording of the film, developing and projection were seen as separate work steps. 
Accordingly, Vertov’s concept of cinematic perception does not constitute a 
disruption of vision since it points to the moment of capturing an image rather than to 
the relation of image and spectator in the cinema. Although Vertov’s cinematic eye 
manifesto fundamentally challenges the relation between seeing and recording, it is by 
far more of a novel way to show than a novel way to see. The same applies to military 
surveillance with its new forms of visualization, which was established by techniques of 
aerial photography dating as far back as World War I. They can hardly be described as 
‘machines of vision’, as Christoph Asendorf had proposed (2006, 31). The combination 
of camera technology and vertical perspective in aircraft reconnaissance certainly 
allowed for new perspectives, but it relied on the subsequent development and 





Imaging in film and photography generally required tools and techniques that inhibit the 
simultaneous production and presentation of images. This separation has been 
suspended by contemporary transmission, sensor, and display technologies. With these 
technologies image production, processing, and transmission are possible in real-time 
and thus images are increasingly integrated into visual practice. This type of real-time 
image processing and transmission has blurred the distinction between vision and 
visualization as well as between observation and representation. It has set the scene for 
a synchronization of seeing and acting, in which humans and machines can remotely 
interact with one another. Real-time visualization has become the standard for a variety 
of image-guided practices in remote warfare (in particular in unmanned aerial 
systems).3 
Figure 4 presents an illustration featured in the manual of a training program for 
remotely piloted aircrafts conducted at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada (the United 
States Air Force flies most of its drone missions from Creech). The illustration depicts 
the Command and Control links for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).  
 
                                                
3 Derek Gregory distinguishes the different terms used when referring to drones: “A ‘drone’ is the popular 
term for the aircraft [...], but the United States Air Force prefers Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV); when these aircrafts are part of an integrated network [...] this is 
referred to as an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). To describe them as ‘unmanned’ is misleading, 
however, because while a UAV does not carry a pilot, the system is operated and supported by several 
hundred personnel.” (Gregory 2011, 207) 





Fig. 4. Command and Control Options of Theater Unmanned Aerial Systems. Creech 
Air Force Base Army Tactical Pocket Guide for Organic/Non Organic Group 3/4/5 
UAS, 2010, 52. 
 
Whereas traditional aviation requires pilots to act independently, the UAS comprise a 
complex network of human actors and technical sensors. It relies on the orchestration of 
relay stations, operators, ground troops, intelligence analysts, military lawyers, and 
imaging specialists (Gregory 2011, 195). One of its key features is the spatial divide 
between actors, both human and technical. It creates a disembodied space of operation, 
in which the reception and the transmission of digital data determines the interaction 
between multiple actors (Franz 2016). While information exchange between actors 
depends on communication with chat clients and radio transmission, the knowledge of 
elements in the environment – the so-called ‘situational awareness’ – relies almost 
exclusively on the visualization of sensor data. What might sound trivial is essential for 
understanding the nature of remotely operated aircrafts and their visual regimes: Images 
are no longer imprints of what is; they become a precondition for action. This implies a 
structurally different visual practice then the established methods for planning and 
surveillance. Note for instance Colin Powell’s presentation of aerial footage as 
‘evidence’ of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that was used as a proof that called for 
intervention (Powell 2003). While image analysis has been crucial to reconnaissance, 
remote imaging and sensor mobility have ushered a new type of intervention, namely 
Politik  Nummer 1 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 53 
one in which operation is guided or misguided by what images show or critically fail to 
show. Coupling operation to images is thus not merely a question of what visual 
surveillance can reveal. What is at stake is rather that interaction with visual sensor 
networks structures action and perception. This calls for a closer examination of the 







Fig 5. Advanced Cockpit Ground Control Station. General Atomics Aeronautical 
Systems, Inc. 2015. 
 
The ground control station, shown in Figure 5, is the visual and operative interface 
between human actors and technical sensors in drone operations. It facilitates remote 
forms of access into the operating field. The photo shows the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 
Reaper advanced cockpit ground control station. Though it has not been deployed in 
combat yet, the cockpit is designed to provide crews with a more immersive visual 
combat experience. According to its developers, the system was designed to integrate 
human operators, aiming for ‘enhanced situational awareness’ through ‘human-centered 
display technology’ (General Atomics, 2016). The pilot and the so-called ‘sensor 
operator’ sit in front of a panel of six 24-inch touch-sensitive monitors that are arranged 
in two rows. The top row monitors provide a wide-angled view of the operating field 
using a combination of live video footage, virtual terrain images, and air traffic data. A 
small video frame incorporated into the top middle monitor displays the live feed; it 
provides a rather restricted field of view. The top monitor ensemble displays a 3D 
topographical model in a 120-degree view as if the crew members were sitting in an 
actual cockpit. The bottom middle monitor allows top view access to the battlefield and 
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offers a variety of visualization options (e.g. mission planning, map overlays). The left 
and right bottom monitors contain mission data, command and control options, aircraft 
data, as well as chat and email client interface.  
In order to adequately operate the aircraft from afar, crewmembers must integrate 
a complex system of visual information and sensor technology into their workflow. 
They must “visually discriminate and synthesize various images and complex data on 
several electronic screens while maintaining heightened vigilance to numerous sources 
of visual and auditory information necessary for sustaining situational and spatial 
awareness” (Chappelle, McDonald, McMillan 2011, 5). Visualization of the operating 
field combines virtual geo-data together with real-time sensor data provided by the 
Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS). This system is called the ‘sensor ball’, which 
is mounted onto the hull of the MQ-9 Reaper (manufactured by Raytheon). The MTS is 
controlled by the sensor operator. It comprises an infrared sensor, a light amplifier, a 




Fig. 6. Multi-spectral Targeting System on a Reaper MQ-9 at Creech Air Force Base. 
Bryan William Jones  (Creative Commons BY-NC 3.0). 
 
Understanding the different modalities of visualization and observation is crucial for 
navigating the aircraft, and even more for combat decision-making. The ground control 
station represents a human-machine configuration, in which images do not only enhance 
military operation, but also prompt the crew to carry out actions in a specific way. From 
riflescopes to jet fighter helmets, this type of image-guided configuration is utilized in a 
variety of military applications. It challenges the relationship between eye and 
instrument as well as between organism and mechanism focusing on the situation 
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instead of the result of image production. It shifts the attention from iconicity and 
visibility towards the interaction with imaging technology. 
Image and media theory has finally turned its attention to the connection between 
image and operation, in particular when it relates to operative images and operative 
iconicity (Farocki 2004; Hinterwaldner 2013; Hoel & Lindseth 2014; Krämer 2009). 
Conceptualizing images in the context of operation, Aud Sissel Hoel and Frank 
Lindseth highlight three reasons why ‘operational approaches’ provide possibilities for 
rethinking images: 
 
“First, they offer dynamic approaches that analyze phenomena into doings and 
happenings rather than into things and static entities; second, they offer relational 
approaches that conceive identity in terms of open-ended processes of becoming; 
and third, by so doing, they allow us to ascribe agency to images, and crucially, 
to conceive agency as distributed across interconnected assemblages of people, 
practices, and mediating artifacts.” (Hoel & Lindseth 2014, 2) 
 
Conceptualizing images in the context of operation hinges less on representation, 
manifestation, and aesthetics but rather emphasizes the practices through which images 
become media of control and instruction.  
In a military context, the linking of image and operation does not only require 
crews to correctly analyze images. It is neither enough to be able to distinguish a 
suspect from a civilian nor to identify a weapon based on color differences of 
thermographic visualization. Wherever images negotiate between soldiers and the 
battlefield, the interplay of structures and processes, behind and in front of the screen, 
are crucial in order to understand how operators act through imaging technologies and 
how images enable or disable action and perception. However, despite increasing 
interest in drone operations (due also to the rising number of civilian casualties), this 
aspect of image operation is still largely overlooked. Image analysis and interpretation 
is rarely contextualized in relation to the question how imaging technology mediates the 
operator’s views, as Gerrit Walczak argues in his study of the so-called ‘collateral 
murder’ video published by WikiLeaks in 2010 (Walczak 2012). The video captured the 
killing of Iraqi civilians by a US Air Force combat helicopter in Baghdad on July 12 
2007. It reveals some aspects of what the helicopter crew saw, and it displays the 
communication via radio. However, the video does not offer enough information to 
understand the crew’s decision-making process. Walczak shows that it is the technical 
character of visualization, such as the display architecture, the resolution, the scope, or 
the light exposure that had a significant impact on the crew’s action (Walczak 2012, 
12). The video itself does not communicate this information, and accordingly it does not 
allow for a comprehensive understanding of the crew’s action and perception. 
Confronted with a variety of imaging techniques and modalities of visualization, the 
crew became embedded in a complex network of technological data that intervened in 
their workflow. As Walczak notes: 




“What a camera captures from above and who views its recording, when and in 
what way, is dependent on the peculiarity of the apparatus and its interaction with 
the aircraft and its crew, ever since Nadar took the first [aerial] photographs from 
a hot air balloon in 1858.” (Walczak 2012, 10) 
 
Conducting operations through imaging technology does not only require an applied 
visual knowledge but brings up the question to what degree authorship, presence, or 





In his PhD thesis "The MQ-9 Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft: Humans and Machines 
in Action" Timothy Cullen, a former US Air Force pilot, investigates how remotely 
piloted aircraft crews interact with imaging technology. In order to understand how the 
crew produces visibility with and through the sensor system Cullen particularly 
analyzed the training program of MQ-9 Reaper sensor operators (Cullen 2011, 117–
201). Sensor operators act as intermediaries between sensors and visualizations. For 
instance, in selecting image modalities, sections, or magnification, they define the 
modes of seeing. In order to provide a stable visual field, operators in charge of the 
sensor ball maneuver its sensors carefully and irrespective of the aircraft position. This 
requires a constant synchronization of the sensors with the visual field. As Cullen’s 
study demonstrates, this is achieved by strategically eliminating the gap between human 
vision and the sensor system. According to Cullen, instructors tell trainees to “become 
the camera” (2011, 166). This idea of human-sensor fusion is repeated in the language 
both instructors and trainees employ: “Instructor sensor operators taught their students 
to visualize themselves being on the Reaper aircraft, floating above the ground and 
looking down at their quarry from the belly of the aircraft” (Cullen 2011, 166). 
The ways how “experienced sensor operators interacted with the HUD [Heads Up 
Display]” led Cullen to identify what he terms a “feeling of remote presence” (Cullen 
2011, 166 & 17). As he puts it: 
 
“After a couple hundred hours of flight experience and a sense of comfort with 
the modes, interfaces, and capabilities of the sensor ball, sensor operators began 
to feel like they were a part of the machine. With proficiency as a ‘sensor’, sensor 
operators found themselves shifting and straining their bodies in front of the 
HUD to look around an object. As pilots flew closer to a target, the transported 
operators tilted their heads in anticipation of the camera’s movement” (Cullen 
2011, 167). 
 
Politik  Nummer 1 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 57 
Interaction with images and control panels not only establishes a cognitive relation 
between vision and visualization but also develops a physical relation deeply 
intertwined with the function of the aircraft:  
 
“Feelings of remote presence helped sensor operators move their bodies, and 
instructors believed that operators who felt as if they were ‘flying the sensor’ 
could hold their attention longer on a scene, were more curious of what they saw, 
could sense change and movement easier. A sensor operator’s close relationship 
with the sensor ball helped them to do their jobs well. Experienced sensor 
operators who ‘flew’ the sensor ball from an 18-inch monitor became the 
machine. They became the eye in the sky.” (Cullen 2011, 166) 
 
With regard to Cullen’s study, a media-deterministic reading that solely assigns agency 
to technology does not serve as an explanation for the entanglement between the 
operator and the sensor system. The gap between observer and camera, which also 
characterized Vertov’s texts, fundamentally questions the relation between the eye and 
the image. It proposes a notion of vision that surrenders the physical eye in favor of the 
technological eye. Nevertheless, a sheer media-deterministic approach would 
misleadingly imply that one has to negotiate the problem of perception beyond human 
vision by detaching it from the body. As Cullen argues, this does not seem to be the 
case with remotely controlled aircrafts. On the contrary, while Vertov celebrates the 
mobility of the camera as an emancipation of human vision, Cullen ties the Reaper 
sensor system back to physical experience. As mentioned above, the synchronization of 
the body and the sensor system is crucial to the production of visualization. However, 
also an exclusive anthropocentric approach that regards the apparatus as an extension of 
the human eye does not help to sufficiently grasp the essence of this kind of human-
machine nexus. As drone operators relinquish their subject-centric viewpoint, no trace 
of a central human presence is preserved. The visual architecture of ground control 
stations has established a context for action, in which the apparatus can hardly be 
described as an extension of the eye. The subject-centered representational space of 
classical aesthetics is abandoned in favor of a device-centric perspective.  
 Thus, real-time image-guided interventions in warfare suggest a new type of 
human-machine entanglement that goes beyond simplified subject-object relations. 
They embed soldiers into a complex system of image production, transmission and 
perception that separate their bodies from the battlefield and at the same time mediates 
between them.4 This mediation significantly relies on the synchronization of human 
vision and technological visualization: The sensor balls cannot see, but operators claim 
                                                
4 Frédéric Merget has pointed to the deconstruction of the concept of the battlefield in the context of 
remote warfare: “The emergence of technologies of targeted killings, including the use of unmanned 
drones, has had the effect of potentially bringing the battlefield to any location in the world in novel and 
radical ways that defy the traditional idea of the battlefield. Most targets of drone attacks will never know 
that they were targets and will be hit in a variety of locations (roads, homes, offices), which bear little 
relation to a battlefield, if only because there is less a battle than an instant flash annihilating the enemy, 
leaving no chance of flight or surrender.” (Merget 2012, 17) 
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to see through them transcending the anthropological bounds of visual experience. 
However, this effect only seems to take hold in cooperation with the machine. Phrases 
such as ‘eye in the sky’ or ‘becoming the machine’ suggest a seemingly continuous 
transition between vision and visualization as well as between technical and 
anthropological ways of ‘seeing’. Lucy Suchman describes this synthesis as a “deadly 
bio-convergence at the boundaries of humans and machines” in which action and 
decision are embedded in assemblages of increasingly complex “sociotechnical 
mediation” (2015, 19). In the context of military interventions, Suchman and Jutta 
Weber propose to rethink “conceptions of agency and autonomy, from attributes 
inherent in entities, to effects of discourses and material practices that variously conjoin 
and/or delineate differences between humans and machines” (Suchman & Weber 2014, 
2).  
The notion of remote vision can, then, be understood as a conjoining human 
machine configuration. UAS operators have to make decisions, often with deadly 
consequences, that are based on their ability to produce visibility dependent on the 
constrained views provided by the sensor system. As images deliver exclusive visual 
access to the battlefield, they become a precondition for action. They do not only show, 
but also prompt operators to see and carry out an action. Although the visual-motor 
coordination that is necessary to synchronize head and camera alignment requires, to 
some extent, a mitigation of human machine separation, it is imperative for UAS 
operators to understand and train how images become agents in an increasingly 
complex socio-technological assemblage. In this respect, it seems highly controversial 
that military training recommends to exercise the dissolving of the separation between 
sense and sensor since mediated vision in remote warfare constitutes nothing less than a 
fundamental intervention in the operator’s workflow, their individual autonomy, and 
their decision-making processes. Accordingly, a critique of remotely piloted aircraft 
operations does not only need to document their devastating consequences. It must also 
investigate the fusion of body and apparatus to reveal the implications of technological 
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